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KENTUCKY LAW SURVEY
Corporations
By

WILLBURT

D. HAm*

INTRODUCTION

This Survey follows the format of previous Surveys' by
dealing first with developments in corporation law at the federal
level. Discussion of these developments is followed by comments
on selected state court decisions involving application of state
corporate law principles.
Whereas last year's survey period was marked by a lull in
corporation law decisions by the Supreme Court of the United
States, the current period produced several such decisions.2 Three
of these are directly concerned with application of the antifraud
provisions of the federal securities laws and have been selected
for special comment.3 In the first of these decisions, the Supreme
* Professor of Law, University of Kentucky. B.S. 1937, J.D. 1940, University of
Illinois; LL.M. 1941, Harvard University.
I The survey period runs from July, 1984, to July, 1985. For previous corporation
law surveys, see Ham, Kentucky Law Survey-Corporations,73 Ky. L.J. 275 (1984-85);
Ham, Kentucky Law Survey-Corporations, 72 Ky. L.J. 279 (1983-84); Ham, Kentucky
Law Survey-Corporations, 71 Ky. L.J. 251 (1982-83); Ham, Kentucky Law SurveyCorporations,70 Ky. L.J. 223 (1981-82); Ham, Kentucky Law Survey-Corporations,69
KY. L.J. 453 (1980-81); Ham, Kentucky Law Survey-Corporations, 68 Ky. L.J. 495
(1979-80); Ham, Kentucky Law Survey-Corporations, 67 Ky. L.J. 457 (1978-79); Ham,
Kentucky Law Survey-Corporations, 66 Ky. L.J. 477 (1977-78); Ham, Kentucky Law
Survey-Corporations,65 Ky. L.J. 255 (1976-77); Ham, Kentucky Law Survey-Corporations, 64 Ky. L.J. 253 (1975-76); and Ham, Kentucky Law Survey-Corporations,63 Ky.
L.J. 739 (1974-75).
- See notes 4-6 infra and accompanying text.
United States Supreme Court decisions of interest to corporate and securities
lawyers, other than those specifically discussed in this Survey, include: Dean Witter
Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 105 S. Ct. 1238 (1985) (Plaintiffs in federal securities fraud suits
with pendent arbitrable state claims and nonarbitrable federal claims arising out of the
same transaction cannot be denied arbitration of the state claims under the "doctrine
of intertwining."); Lowe v. SEC, 105 S. Ct. 2557 (1985) (publishers of nonpersonalized
investment advice in securities newsletters not required to register as investment advisers
under Investment Advisers Act of 1940); and Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 105 S.
Ct. 3291 (1985) (prior conviction and racketeering requirements for civil actions under
the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) rejected).
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Court considered the extent to which the in pari delicto defense
should be available to defendants in insider trading suits brought
under the federal securities laws. 4 In a second decision, the
Supreme Court considered the extent to which misrepresentation
or nondisclosure should be regarded as a necessary element in
actions brought under section 14(e) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, relating to fraudulent conduct in connection with
tender offers.' In a third case, the Supreme Court considered
the applicability of the federal securities laws' antifraud provisions to stock sales of a business under the "sale of business
doctrine." 6 Following the discussion of these three Supreme
Court cases, attention is focused on a recent case from the
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals dealing with recovery of
short-swing profits under section 16(b) of the Securities Ex7
change Act of 1934.
At the state level, cases decided by the Supreme Court of
Delaware continue to remain in the forefront of state corporation law. Two such cases from the Delaware Supreme Court
have been selected for special comment. The first relates to an
important limitation placed upon the availability of the business
judgment rule as a defense to director liability.8 The second
relates to approval by the Delaware Supreme Court of management's use of a selective exchange offer as a defense to a hostile
takeover bid. 9 Discussion of the two Delaware cases is followed
by reference to a decision by the Iowa Supreme Court dealing
with whether limited liability remains available during a gap in
corporate existence resulting from lapse of the corporate charter.' 0
Finally, reference is made to a recent decision by the Kentucky
Court of Appeals in which the court considered whether, under
the appraisal provisions of the Kentucky Business Corporation

See Eichler v. Berner, 105 S. Ct. 2622 (1985).
See Schreiber v. Burlington N., Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2458 (1985).
6 See Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 105 S. Ct. 2297 (1985). A companion
case involving the sale of business doctrine decided by the United States Supreme Court
on the same day as Landreth will also be mentioned. See Gould v. Ruefenacht, 105 S.
Ct. 2308 (1985).
See Super Stores, Inc. v. Reiner, 737 F.2d 962 (lth Cir. 1984).
See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
See Adam v. Mt. Pleasant Bank & Trust Co., 355 N.W.2d 868 (Iowa 1984).
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Act, the appraisal remedy provided dissenting shareholders in
merger transactions is the exclusive remedy even where illegality
or fraud is alleged."
I.
A.

FEDERAL CORPORATION LAW

Insider Trading

Cases involving unlawful insider trading activity have long
been the source of a substantial volume of litigation under the

federal securities laws' antifraud provisions.' 2 The availability of
the in pari delicto defense is one issue in these insider trading3
cases that has remained unresolved in the lower federal courts.'
In Eichler v. Berner,'4 the United States Supreme Court sought
to provide guidelines for the use of this defense in securities
cases.' 5 The Court stated the question before it as: "whether the
common-law in pari delicto defense bars a private damages

action under the federal securities laws against corporate insiders
and broker-dealers who fraudulently induce investors to purchase
securities by misrepresenting that they are conveying material
6
nonpublic information about the issuer."'

In Eichler, a group of investors in T.O.N.M. Oil & Gas
Exploration Corporation (TONM) charged, in an action filed in
the United States District Court for the Northern District of
California, that they had been induced to buy large quantities

of TONM stock in the over-the-counter market as the result of
false and misleading inside information about the company con-

See Yeager v. Paul Semonin Co., 691 S.W.2d 227 (Ky. Ct. App. 1985).
For an overview of the law pertaining to insider trading, see Carlton & Fischel,
The Regulation of Insider Trading, 35 STAN. L. REv. 857 (1983).
" In pari delicto means literally "of equal fault." Tarasi v. Pittsburgh Nat'l Bank,
555 F.2d 1152, 1156 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 965 (1977). For decisions holding
that the in par!delicto defense is available, see id. at 1152; Kuehnert v. Texstar Corp.,
412 F.2d 700 (5th Cir. 1969). For a discussion holding that the defense is unavailable,
see Berner v. Lazzaro, 730 F.2d 1319 (9th Cir. 1984), affd sub. nom. Eichler v. Berner,
105 S. Ct. 2622 (1985).
105 S. Ct. 2622 (1985).
" For an earlier discussion of the in par! delicto defense in the context of other
securities law issues, see Ruder, Multiple Defendants in Securities Law Fraud Cases:
Aiding and Abetting, Conspiracy, In Pari Delicto, Indemnification, and Contribution,
120 U. PA. L. REV. 597, 659 (1972).
11 105 S. Ct. at 2624.

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 74

veyed to them by Leslie Neadeau, president of TONM and
Charles Lazzaro, a registered securities broker employed by Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. (Eichler).17 Plaintiffs alleged
that Lazzaro told them that through his acquaintance with TONM
insiders he had learned of a Surinam gold mining venture in
which TONM planned to participate that, when announced,
would result in a substantial increase in the value of TONM
stock.' s When the plaintiffs asked Neadeau about the accuracy
of the tips received from Lazzaro, he refused to confirm or deny
the information, but did verify that Lazzaro was a "trustworthy" person. 9 Although the plaintiffs' TONM stock initially
increased in price, the shares ultimately fell below the purchase
price when the mining venture failed. 20 Claiming that Lazzaro
and Neadeau had given the misinformation to manipulate the
price of TONM stock for their personal benefit 2 plaintiffs filed
suit to recover their losses. Plaintiffs contended that the scheme
2
violated section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
and Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Rule lOb-5 prom23
ulgated thereunder.

Id.
11Id. According to the plaintiffs' allegations, Lazzaro had told them that " 'TOMN
stock, which was then selling from $1.50 to $3.00/share, would increase in value from
$10 to $15/share within a short period of time, and ... might increase to $100/share'
within a year." Id.
" Id.
Id. at 2624-25.
21 Id.
at 2625.
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982). This section provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use
of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails, or
of any facility of any national securities exchange1

(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so
registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may precribe as
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of
investors.
Id.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1985). The rule provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use
of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails
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The district court dismissed the complaint as not stating a
cause of action, reasoning that the plaintiff investors, as tippees

of inside information, were themselves in violation of SEC Rule
10b-5 and, under the in pari delicto doctrine, were barred from
recovery. 24 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the

district court's decision. 25 In reversing, the court rejected "the

notion that a defrauded investor is not entitled to recover damages against a broker or an insider solely because the complaint
shows that the plaintiff has violated the federal securities laws. "26

The court said that it took this position "[b]ecause we feel that
securities professionals and corporate officers who have allegedly
engaged in fraud should not be permitted to invoke the in pari
delicto doctrine to shield themselves from the consequences of
their fraudulent misrepresentation. ' 27 The United States Su28
preme Court granted certiorari.
In an opinion written by Justice Brennan, the Supreme Court
concurred in the court of appeals' judgment that the in pari
delicto doctrine should not preclude the suit by the plaintiff

investors in Eichler.29 Referring to its rejection of the in pari
or of any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made,
in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not
misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
Id.

105 S. Ct. at 2625.
Berner v. Lazzaro, 730 F.2d 1319 (9th Cir. 1984).
Id. at 1324.
-' Id. at 1320. Stressing that the federal securities laws aim to protect public
investors, the court remarked that "[t]he rule we adopt today will further public policy
by providing greater protection for the investing public." Id. at 1323 (citation omitted).
The court added that "[t]o allow professionals in the securities industry and corporate
officers to hide behind the in pari delicto defense gives them a license to defraud the
investing public with little fear of prosecution," and that "[a]ny deterrent effect against
the use of insider information through imposition of the in pari delicto defense is
outweighed by the resulting adverse consequence to the market and innocent investors."
-

Id.

Eichler v. Berner, 105 S. Ct. 776 (1985).
105 S. Ct. at 2626. Chief Justice Burger concurred in the judgment. Justice
Marshall did not participate in the decision. Id. at 2633.
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delicto defense in Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International
Parts Corp. ,30 involving application of the defense to a private
suit brought under the antitrust laws, the Court held that "the
views expressed in Perma Life apply with full force to implied
causes of action under the federal securities laws." ' 3' This means,
said the Court, that
a private action for damages in these circumstances may be
barred on the grounds of the plaintiff's own culpability only
where (1) as a direct result of his own actions, the plaintiff
bears at least substantially equal responsibility for the violations he seeks to redress, and (2) preclusion of suit would not
significantly interfere with the effective enforcement3 2 of the
securities laws and protection of the investing public.
Relating these tests to tippees who trade on inside information, the Court noted that, as a result of its decision in Dirks
v. SEC, 33 a tippee becomes liable for trading on inside information only if the tippee is aware that the insider passing along
the information has breached his fiduciary duties to the corporation's shareholders. 34 Accordingly, the Court concluded: "In
the context of insider trading, we do not believe that a person
whose liability is solely derivative can be said to be as culpable
as one whose breach of duty gave rise to that liability in the
' 3
first place.

- 392 U.S. 134 (1968).
" 105 S. Ct. at 2629.
Id.
463 U.S. 646 (1983).
'
105 S. Ct. at 2630. In Dirks the Court held that "a tippee assumes a fiduciary
duty to the shareholders of a corporation not to trade on material nonpublic information
only when the insider has breached his fiduciary duty to the shareholders by disclosing
the information to the tippee and the tippee knows or should know that there has been
a breach." 463 U.S. at 660 (footnote omitted). The Dirks case was a sequel to Chiarella
v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980), in which the Court held that liability for failure
to disclose material nonpublic information was "premised upon a duty to disclose arising
from a relationship of trust and confidence between parties to a transaction." Id. at
230.
" 105 S. Ct. at 2630 (footnote omitted). Commenting that a tippee's liability to
disclose or abstain turns upon whether the insider breached a fiduciary duty to shareholders in tipping material nonpublic information, the Dirks Court remarked that in
determining whether disclosure is a breach of duty "the test is whether the insider
personally will benefit, directly or indirectly, from his disclosure." 463 U.S. at 662. The
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Applying its reasoning to the circumstances in Eichler, the
Court concluded that "[tihere is certainly no basis for concluding
at this stage of this litigation that the respondents [plaintiff
3' 6
investors] were in pari delicto with Lazzaro and Neadeau.
The Court noted that these two had masterminded the "scheme
to manipulate the market in TONM securities for their own
personal benefit, 37 using the plaintiff investors "as unwitting
dupes to inflate the price of TONM stock." 38 The Court agreed
"that the typically voluntary nature of an investor's decision
impermissibly to trade on an inside tip renders the investor more
blameworthy than someone who is party to a contract solely by
virtue of another's overweening bargaining power," ' 39 but it disagreed "that an investor who engages in such trading is necessarily as blameworthy as a corporate insider or broker-dealer
' 40
who discloses the information for personal gain."
Furthermore, the public interest would be best served by
denying the in pari delicto defense as applied to insider trading
cases. As the Court pointed out, "the public interest will most
frequently be advanced if defrauded tippees are permitted to
bring suit and to expose illegal practices by corporate insiders
and broker-dealers to full public view for appropriate sanctions. "4' Pointing to the limited resources available to the SEC
to police fraudulent practices in the securities industry 4 2 the
Court indicated that it felt that "deterrence of insider trading
most frequently will be maximized by bringing enforcement pressures to bear on the sources of such information-corporate
insiders and broker-dealers. ' 43 Also, the Court concluded:
Court added that "[aibsent some personal gain, there has been no breach of duty to
stockholders" and that "absent a breach by the insider, there is no derivative breach."
Id. (footnote omitted).
' 105 S.Ct. at 2631.
Id.
' Id.

Id. at 2630.
'

Id.

Id. at 2633.
Id. at 2631.
"' Id. at 2632. The Court added that "[i]n addition, corporate insiders and brokerdealers will in many circumstances be more responsive to the deterrent pressure of
potential sanctions; they are more likely than ordinary investors to be advised by counsel
and thereby to be informed fully of the 'allowable limits on their conduct.' " Id. (citing
Kuehnert v. Texstar Corp., 412 F.2d 700, 706 (5th Cir. 1969) (Godbold, J., dissenting)).
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We... believe that denying the in pari delicto defense in such

circumstances will best promote the primary objective of the
federal securities laws-protection of the investing public and
the national economy through the promotion of "a high standard of business ethics ... in every facet of the securities
industry.' ' 4

B.

Tender Offers

A troublesome issue regarding the scope and application of
section 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 was recently
resolved by the United States Supreme Court in Schreiber v.
Burlington Northern, Inc.41 Section 14(e), which was added to
the Exchange Act in 1968 by the Williams Act,46 makes unlawful
the use of any "fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative acts or
practices, in connection with any tender offer. ' 47 The lower
federal courts have been divided about whether some form of
misrepresentation or nondisclosure is necessary to constitute a
violation of section 14(e) or whether manipulative practices affecting market activity in a corporation's stock are sufficient to con4
stitute a violation.

- 105 S. Ct. at 2631 (quoting SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375
U.S. 180, 186-87 (1963)). The Eichler Court did not believe that failure to provide "a
vigorous allowance of the in pari delicto defense" would encourage tippee insider trading
by giving tippees what some lower courts had referred to as " 'in effect, an enforceable
warranty that secret information is true.' " 105 S. Ct. at 2632 (quoting 412 F.2d at
705). For one thing, the Supreme Court said, "tippees who bring suit in an attempt to
cash in on their 'enforceable warranties' expose themselves to the threat of substantial
civil and criminal penalties for their own potentially illegal conduct." 105 S. Ct. at 2633
(footnote omitted).
4 105 S. Ct. 2458 (1985).
1 Williams Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1982).
47Id. § 78n(e). The full text of the section reads:
It shall be unlawful for any person to make any untrue statement of
a material fact or omit to state any material fact necessary in order to
make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which
whey were made, not misleading, or to engage in any fraudulent, deceptive,
or manipulative acts or practices, in connection with any tender offer or
request or invitation for tenders, or any solicitation of security holders in
opposition to or in favor of any such offer, request, or invitation. The
Commission shall, for the purposes of this subsection, by rules and regulations define, and prescribe means reasonably designed to prevent, such
acts and practices as are fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative.
4 Compare Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 669 F.2d 366 (1981), cert. denied,
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The issue arose in Schreiber when Burlington Northern, Inc.,
through a wholly owned subsidiary, made a tender offer to
purchase 25.1 million shares of stock in El Paso Gas Company
at twenty-four dollars per share. 49 Although the El Paso Gas
Company management opposed the attempted takeover, the
shareholders fully subscribed the tender offer. s0 Burlington
Northern, however, did not accept the tendered shares but instead, after negotiating a new and friendly takeover agreement
with the management of El Paso Gas Company, rescinded the
original tender offer and made a new tender offer to El Paso
Gas Company's shareholders for only twenty-one million shares
at twenty-four dollars per share.' The new offer was oversubscribed, thereby subjecting the shareholders who retendered to
substantial proration and causing those shareholders who had
tendered during the first offer to receive a diminished payment
for their shares. 2 Barbara Schreiber, one of these shareholders,
filed suit on behalf of herself and other shareholders similarly
situated, claiming that Burlington Northern's withdrawal of its
first tender offer and substitution of its second constituted a
"manipulative" practice in violation of section 14(e). 3 The district court dismissed the suit,5 4 reasoning that a key ingredient
to stating a claim for manipulation under section 14(e) is deception based upon the lack of full disclosure of information to the
corporations's shareholders. 5 The Third Circuit Court of Ap-

455 U.S. 982 (1982), in which the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals treated manipulation
alone as sufficient, with Data Probe Acquisition Corp. v. Datatab, Inc., 722 F.2d 1 (2d
Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1052 (1984) and Feldbaum v. Avon Prods., Inc., 741
F.2d 234 (8th Cir. 1984), in which the Second Circuit and the Eighth Circuit stressed
the need for some form of misrepresentation or nondisclosure.
- 105 S. Ct. at 2460.
Id.
" Id. The new takeover agreement, in addition to revising the original tender offer,
provided for purchase by Burlington Northern of 4,166,667 shares from El Paso Gas
Company at $24 per share, procedural protections against a squeeze-out merger of the
remaining El Paso Gas Company shareholders, and "golden parachute" contracts on
behalf of four of El Paso Gas Company's senior officers. Id.
Id.
Id. at 2460-61.
Schreiber v. Burlington N., Inc., 568 F. Supp. 197 (D.C. Del. 1983).
Id. at 202-03. The district court commented:
If the Court were to hold that defendants' actions in terminating the
December tender offer and initiating the January tender offer constituted
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peals affirmed 5 6 agreeing that "§ 14(e) was enacted principally
as a disclosure statute," ' 7 and that "§ 14(e) was not intended to
create a federal cause of action for all harms suffered because
of the proffering or the withdrawal of tender offers.''Ss The
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.5 9
Affirming the court of appeals' judgment 6 0 the Supreme
Court, in an opinion written by Chief Justice Burger, rejected
the contention of Schreiber under section 14(e) that acts that
artificially affect the price of a target company's stock can be
considered "manipulative" even though fully disclosed. 61 The
Court held that "the term 'manipulative' as used in section 14(e)
requires misrepresentation or nondisclosure.' '62 The petitioner's
position regarding the meaning of "manipulative" ignored the
normal connotation of "misrepresentation" as used in the antifraud provisions of the securities laws.63 Furthermore, the Court
said, "[o]ur conclusion that 'manipulative' acts under § 14(e)
require misrepresentation or nondisclosure is buttressed by the

manipulation under Section 14(e), then potential offerors and management
of target companies would be subject to liability every time a tender offer
is revised or negotiated. Some latitude must be given in the application of
the Williams Act for it was designed to enhance market activity through
open supply and demand, not artificially restrain it.
Id. at 203.
Schreiber v. Burlington N., Inc., 731 F.2d 163 (3d Cir. 1984).
' Id. at 165-66.
" Id. at 165. The court of appeals commented that "[a]bsent a requirement of
deception, the Williams Act would mandate that the federal courts supervise the substantive fairness of practically all tender offers." Id. at 166. The court felt that this
result would conflict with the Supreme Court's concern expressed in Santa Fe Industries
where it said: "Absent a clear indication of congressional intent, we are reluctant to
federalize the substantial portion of the law of corporations that deals with transactions
in securities, particularly where established state policies of corporate regulation would
be overriden." Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 479 (1977).
Schreiber v. Burlington N., Inc., 105 S. Ct. 81 (1984).
105 S. Ct. at 2461.
" Id. Justice Powell took no part in the decision. Justice O'Connor took no part
in either the consideration or decision of the case. Id. at 2465.
' Id.
IId. at 2461-62. The Court alluded to its statement in Santa Fe Indus., referring
to the proper meaning to give to the term "manipulative," that "[t]he term refers
generally to practices, such as viash sales, matched orders, or rigged prices, that are
intended to mislead investors by artificially affecting market activity." 430 U.S. at 476
(citations omitted).
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purpose and legislative history of the provision."' 64 In fact, observed the Court:
Nowhere in the legislative history is there the slightest suggestion that § 14(e) serves any purpose other than disclosure, or
that the term "manipulative" should be read as an invitation
to the courts to oversee the substantive fairness of tender
offers; the quality of any offer is a matter for the marketplace. 65

Based upon this reasoning the Court failed to find the actions
of Burlington Northern manipulative since there were no allegations "that the cancellation of the first tender offer was accompanied by any misrepresentation, nondisclosure or
' 66
deception.
Perhaps one of the most important consequences of Schreiber will be removing the cloud cast by the Sixth Circuit Court
of Appeals upon the defensive use of the "lock-up" option to
battle hostile takeover attempts. In Mobil Corp. v. Marathon
Oil Co.,67 the Sixth Circuit treated the "lock-up" option as
manipulative under section 14(e) even in the presence of full
disclosure. 6S Since the Second Circuit flatly rejected this position

105 S. Ct. at 2463.
Id. at 2464 (footnote omitted). The Court added this further observation:
Congress' consistent emphasis on disclosure persuades us that it intended takeover contests to be addressed to shareholders. In pursuit of this
goal, Congress, consistent with the core mechanism of the Securities Exchange Act, created sweeping disclosure requirements and narrow substantive safeguards. The same Congress that placed such emphasis on shareholder
choice would not at the same time have required judges to oversee tender
offers for substantive fairness. It is even less likely that a Congress implementing that intention would express it only through the use of a single
word placed in the middle of a provision otherwise devoted to disclosure.
Id. at 2465.
- Id.
" 669 F.2d 366 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 982 (1982). Lock-up options
have been described as "an arrangement whereby the target company agrees to sell or
grants an option to sell assets, treasury stock or authorized-but-unissued stock to a white
knight to give the friendly suitor a competitive advantage over a raider in the takeover
battle." Lewkow & Forrest, The Lock-Up UnderExchange Act SEC. 14(e), Tan NAT'L
L.J., Mar. 26, 1984, at 15 (footnote omitted).
669 F.2d at 377. Marathon involved the attempt by Marathon Oil Co. to thwart
a takeover by Mobil Corp. through granting to U.S. Steel Corp., as a competing tender
offeror, an option to purchase additional authorized but unissued shares of Marathon
'-
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in the Data Probe69 and Buffalo Forge° cases, this conflict in
the lower federal courts made effective use of the "lock-up"
option somewhat doubtful, especially in the Sixth Circuit. 7' At

least as far as section 14(e) is concerned, the Schreiber case
should help to put the "lock-up" option on a firmer foundation
as a legitimate defensive tactic in combatting hostile tender offers .72
C. Sale of Business Doctrine
During the present survey period, the United States Supreme
Court, in Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth,73 settled a sharp
common stock and an option to purchase Marathon's interest in oil and mineral rights
in a valuable oil field referred to as the Yates Field. With reference to the options thus
granted by Marathon, the court said:
In our view, it is difficult to conceive of a more effective and manipulative
device than the "lock-up" options employed here, options which not only
artificially affect, but for all practical purposes completely block, normal
healthy market activity and, in fact, could be construed as expressly designed solely for that purpose.
Id. at 374.
-' Data Probe Acquisition Corp. v. Datatab, Inc., 722 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 465 U.S. 1052 (1984).
70 Buffalo Forge Co. v. Ogden Corp., 717 F.2d 757 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 1018 (1983).
'" The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals was careful to state in Marathon that, in
ruling as it did on the lock-up options in that case, it did "not purport to define a rule
of decision for all claims of manipulation under the Williams Act, or indeed for all
forms of options which might be claimed to lock-up takeover battles or otherwise
discourage competing tender offers." 669 F.2d at 377. Nevertheless, as pointed out by
one commentator, the Marathon decision painted "a potentially dismal picture for the
future of defensive tactics available to targets in their efforts to oppose unwanted
bidders." Note, The Future of Lock-Ups After Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil, 27 ST.
Louis U.L.J. 261, 280 (1983).
72 Putting use of the lock-up option on a solid legal foundation would not necessarily mean that all lock-up options would thereby be sanctioned since, as has been
suggested, their use in any given instance should depend upon whether management has
acted within the boundaries of the business judgment rule in seeking to protect the best
interests of the corporation and its shareholders. See Note, supra note 71, at 281-82.
See also MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc. v. Revlon, Inc., 501 A.2d 1239 (Del.
Ch. 1985), aff'd, [Current Binder] FED. SEc. L. RaP. (CCH) J 92,357 (Del. Nov. 1,
1985), in which the Delaware Court of Chancery held that a board of directors' action
extending a lock-up option "to foreclose further bidding in an active bidding situation
and to promote an agreement which relieves the directors of the potentially damaging
consequences of their own defensive policies" violated the directors' fiduciary duty to
the corporation's shareholders and was not therefore entitled to the business judgment
rule's protection. Id. at 1250.
1 105 S. Ct. 2297 (1985).
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conflict that has existed among the federal circuits regarding the
applicability of the sale of business doctrine to the sale of the
controlling interest in a corporation through a sale of its stock. 74

The doctrine has been described as "a judicial limitation on the
application of federal securities laws" by removing stock from
75
the category of a federally defined security.
In Landreth, Samuel Dennis, a Massachusetts tax attorney,
purchased all of the common stock in a lumber company owned

by Ivan Landreth and his sons. 76 Under the terms of the stock
purchase agreement, Dennis assigned the stock he purchased to
B & D Company, a corporation formed for the sole purpose of
acquiring the lumber company stock. B & D Company was then

merged with the lumber company to form Landreth Timber
Company. 77 Dennis and a former client, John Bolton, acquired

all of Landreth Timber Company's Class A stock, representing
an eighty-five percent interest in the equity of the company. The
remaining fifteen percent interest was represented by Class B
stock owned by six other investors. Purchase of the lumber
business did not turn out as favorably as expected and resulted
in the company's selling at a loss its sawmill, which had been
heavily damaged by fire before the purchase of the business. 78

Landreth Timber Company then filed suit seeking rescission of
the stock sale and $2,500,000 in damages. The company claimed
that the Landreth family, through the sale of their stock in the

- For a thorough discussion of the development and application of the sale of
business doctrine in the lower federal courts, see Seldin, When Stock Is Not a Security:
The "Sale of Business" Doctrine Under the FederalSecurities Laws, 37 Bus. LAW. 637
(1982).
" Easley, Recent Developments in the Sale-of-Business Doctrine: Toward a Transactional Context-Based Analysis for Federal Securities Jurisdiction, 39 Bus. LAW. 929,
930 (1984). If the transaction falls outside the purview of federal securities laws, then
there is no subject matter jurisdiction in federal courts. Should applicable state securities
laws be patterned after the federal acts, then additional problems are encountered. Id.
at 930 n.7.
105 S. Ct. at 2300-01.
Id. at 2301.
' Id. After the fire, potential purchasers of the lumber business were advised of
the damage to the sawmill but were told that "the mill would be completely rebuilt and
modernized." Id. at 2300. Nevertheless, "[r]ebuilding costs exceeded earlier estimates,
and new components turned out to be incompatible with existing equipment," resulting
in the mill's failing to live up to the purchasers' expectations. Id. at 2301.
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lumber company, had violated the Securities Act of 193379 by
offering and selling stock without registering it as required by
the Act;80 and had violated the Securities Exchange Act of 19341
by misrepresenting and omitting information concerning the financial condition and future prospects of the lumber company.8
The Landreth family sought summary judgment on the
ground that Landreth Timber Company, under the sale of
business doctrine, had not purchased a "security" within the
meaning of that term as used in the 1933 and 1934 Acts.8 3 The
district court granted summary judgment and dismissed the complaint, joining what it considered to be "the 'growing majority'
of courts that had held that the federal securities laws do not
apply to the sale of 100% of the stock of a closely held corpo-

,' Section 2(1) of the Securities Act of 1933 defines the term "security" to include
(unless the context otherwise requires):
[Amny note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing
agreement, collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription, transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate,
certificate of deposit for a security, fractional undivided interest in oil,
gas, or other mineral rights,.. . or, in general, any interest or instrument
commonly known as a "security", or any certificate of interest or participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of,
or warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing.
15 U.S.C. § 77(b)(1) (emphasis added).
1 105 S.Ct. at 2301.
8,Section 3(a)(10) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 defines the term "security" to include (unless the context otherwise requires):
[A]ny note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, certificate of
interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement or in any oil, gas,
or other mineral royalty or lease, any collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription, transferable share, investment contract,
voting trust certificate, certificate of deposit, for a security, . . . or in
general, any instrument commonly known as a "security;" or any certificate of interest or participation in, temporary or interim certificate for,
receipt for, or warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the
foregoing. ..

15 U.S.C. § 78(a)(10) (Supp. 1985) (emphasis added).
In Landreth, the United States Supreme Court commented that "[w]e have repeatedly ruled that the definitions of 'security' in § 3(a)(10) of the 1934 Act and § 2(1)
of the 1933 Act are virtually identical and will be treated as such in our decisions dealing
with the scope of the term." 105 S.Ct. at 2302 n.1 (citations omitted).
105 S.Ct. at 2301.
83

Id.
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85 The
ration."' ' The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.
6
certiorari.
granted
Court
Supreme
United States
Reversing the court of appeals' decision,8 the Supreme Court,
speaking through Justice Powell, held that when an instrument
labeled "stock" contains the usual characteristics associated with
stock it should be treated as a "security" within the meaning of
the securities acts and the sale of business doctrine should not
apply. 8 The Court rejected the argument that its decision in
United Housing Foundation,Inc. v. Forman 9 required it to look
in every instance to the economic substance of the transaction
to determine whether its test in SEC v. W.J. Howey Co.9° had
been satisfied. 9' The Howey test for determining whether an
instrument could be properly classified as a "security" was
stated in Forman to require "the presence of an investment in
a common venture premised on a reasonable expectation of
profits to be derived from the entrepreneurial or managerial
efforts of others." 92 The Landreth Court noted that in both
Howey and Forman the Court applied the economic realities test
to instruments that did not bear the usual characteristics associated with stock. 93 In Landreth, however, the instrument involved traditional stock and thus came plainly within the statutory
definitionP 4 Furthermore, the Court said, "We would note that
the Howey economic reality test was designed to determine
whether a particular instrument is an 'investment contract,' not

- Id. (citation omitted).
Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 731 F.2d 1348 (9th Cir. 1984).
Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 105 S. Ct. 427 (1984).

"

105 S.Ct. at 2308.
- Id. at 2302-03. See also Gould v. Ruefenacht, 105 S. Ct. 2308, 2311 (1985).
Justice Stevens filed a dissent in both Landreth and Gould in a separate opinion at 105
S. Ct. 2312 (1985).
421 U.S. 837 (1975).
328 U.S. 293 (1946).
"' 105 S. Ct. at 2304.
421 U.S. at 852.
' 105 S. Ct. at 2303-04. Howey involved "an offering of units of a citrus grove
development coupled with a contract for cultivating and marketing the fruit and remitting
the proceeds to the investors." Id. at 2303. Forman involved "the sale of shares of
stock entitling the purchaser to lease an apartment in a housing cooperative." Id. at
2302.
, Id. at 2304.
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whether it fits within any of the examples listed in the statutory
definition of 'security.' "91
In rejecting the sale of business doctrine, the Landreth Court
stressed the undesirability of adopting a doctrine that necessitated determining whether control of a business has passed to a
purchaser.9 6 If the doctrine were applied to a case such as
Landreth where one-hundred percent of a company's stock was
sold, it "would also have to be applied to cases in which less
than 100% of a company's stock was sold, ' 97 which would
inevitably "lead to difficult questions of line-drawing." 98 This
would produce "the prospect that parties to a transaction may
never know whether they are covered by the Acts until they
engage in extended discovery and litigation over a concept as
often elusive as the passage of control."9'
It is significant that in a companion case decided by the
United States Supreme Court on the same day as Landreth, the
Court, in Gould v. Ruefenacht,1°° held that the sale of only fifty
percent of a company's stock was subject to the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws and that the sale of business
doctrine did not apply. 10 ' Referring to the fact that in any given
case application of the sale of business doctrine depends primarily
upon a determination that actual control has passed to the
purchaser, the Court observed that what constitutes actual control "may not be determined simply by ascertaining what percentage of the company's stock has been purchased,"' 0 2 but that

91 Id. at 2305. The Court added that "applying the Howey test to traditional stock
and all other types of instruments listed in the statutory definition would make the Acts'
enumeration of many types of instruments superfluous." Id. (citations omitted).
Id. at 2306-08.
9, Id. at 2307.
" Id.
Id. at 2308 (citation omitted).
-- 105 S. Ct. 2308 (1985).
1"1Id. at 2311.
101Id. at 2310-11. The Court said:
To be sure, in many cases, acquisition of more than 50% of the voting
stock of a corporation effects a transfer of operational control. In other
cases, however, even the ownership of more than 50% may not result in
effective control. In still other cases, de facto operational control may be
obtained by the acquisition of less than 50%.
Id. at 2311.

1985-86]

CORPORATIONS

''actual control may also depend on such variables as voting
rights, veto rights, or requirements for a super-majority, ...
such as may be required by state law or the company's certificate
of incorporation or its by-laws."' 0 3 This, thought the Court,
could only lead to "arbitrary distinctions between transactions
covered by the Acts and those that are not," 1 4 thus again calling

for rejection of the sale of business doctrine as applied to
instruments labeled "stock" and possessing "all of the characteristics typically associated with stock."'0 5
D. Short-Swing Profits
Although the volume of litigation involving insider trading

under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and
SEC Rule lOb-5 has exceeded that under section 16(b) of the
1934 Act,106 relating to short-swing trading in corporate stocks,
nevertheless there continues to be a steady flow of cases under

section 16(b).

°7

One issue that is frequently litigated under sec-

' Id.

Id.
Id. at 2310 (citing 401 U.S. at 851). Justice Stevens dissented in both the
Landreth and Gould cases. See note 88 supra. Justice Stevens said that since "[t]he
legislative history of the 1933 and 1934 Securities Acts makes clear that Congress was
primarily concerned with transactions in securities that are traded in a public market,"
he believes that "Congress wanted to protect investors who do not have access to inside
information and who are not in a position to protect themselves from fraud by obtaining
appropriate contractual warranties." 105 S. Ct. at 2312 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Therefore, he "would hold that the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws are
inapplicable unless the transaction involves (i) the sale of a security that is traded in a
public market; or (ii) an investor who is not in a position to negotiate appropriate
contractual warranties and to insist on access to inside information before consummating
the transaction." Id. at 2313. Referring to the fact that both the Landreth and Gould
cases involved closely-held corporations in which the buyers were in a position to protect
themselves by appropriate warranties, Justice Stevens said that he did not believe "Congress intended the federal securities laws to govern the private sale of a substantial
ownership interest in these operating businesses simply because the transactions were
structured as sales of stock instead of assets." Id.
'" 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1981).
1o,The relevant portion of § 16(b) provides:
For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information which
may have been obtained by such beneficial owner, director, or officer by
reason of his relationship to the issuer, any profit realized by him from
any purchase and sale, or any sale and purchase, of any equity security of
such issuer (other than an exempted security) within any period of less
"4
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tion 16(b) is the proper meaning of "purchase" and "sale" as
used in that section. 0 8 This issue arose once again in Super
0 9 where a
Stores, Inc. v. Reiner,1
defeated tender offeror sold

stock he had acquired in a target company within six months of

than six months, unless such security was acquired in good faith in connection with a debt previously contracted, shall inure to and be recoverable
by the issuer, irrespective of any intention on the part of such beneficial
owner, director, or officer in entering into such transaction of holding the
security purchased or of not repurchasing the security sold for a period
exceeding six months.

15 U.S.C. § 78p(b).
The reference to "such beneficial owner, director, or officer" in § 16(b) relates to
those persons required to file reports of their ownership of corporate "equity securities"
with the SEC under § 16(a). These persons include persons owning more than 10% of
an equity security required to be registered with the SEC pursuant to § 12 of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and persons who are directors or officers of the issuer.
Such persons must report all equity securities owned by them in the corporate issuer.
See 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a). The term "equity security" is broadly defined in § 3(11) of the
Securities Exchange Act to include "any stock or similar security; or any security
convertible, with or without consideration, into such a security; or carrying any warrant
or right to subscribe to or purchase such a security; or any such warrant or right ..
See 15 U.S.C. § 78c(1).
11 Early cases tended toward a literal or objective reading of the statute. See, e.g.,
Park & Tilford, Inc. v. Schulte, 160 F.2d 984 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 761
(1947), where the Second Circuit Court of Appeals treated a conversion of preferred
stock into common stock pursuant to a conversion privilege attached to the preferred
stock followed by a sale of the common stock within six months as a "purchase and
sale" within the meaning of those terms as used in § 16(b). Referring to the definition
of "purchase" in § 3(a)(13) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 as including "any
contract to buy, purchase, or otherwise acquire," the court commented: "Defendants
did not own the common stock in question before they exercised their option to convert;
they did afterward. Therefore they acquired the stock, within the meaning of the Act."
160 F.2d at 987. Later, the courts began to use a more subjective or pragmatic reading
of the statute to determine whether the transaction was one that lent itself to the evils
that Congress sought to control through enactment of the statute. See, e.g., Roberts v.
Eaton, 212 F.2d 82 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 827 (1954), in which the Second
Circuit, applying the pragmatic approach, held that a reclassification of stock did not
result in a "purchase" within the meaning of that term as used in § 16(b). In a later
conversion case arising in the Sixth Circuit, Judge Stewart, after referring to the Second
Circuit's decisions as having "marked out an approach to the problem which is pragmatic
rather than technical," remarked: "The standard that emerges from these decisions can
be simply stated: Every transaction which can reasonably be defined as a purchase will
be so defined, if the transaction is of a kind which can possibly lend itself to the
speculation encompassed by Section 16(b)." Ferraiolo v. Newman, 259 F.2d 342, 34445 (6th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 927 (1959) (footnote omitted). For a review
of the history and development of the pragmatic approach, see Lowenfels, Section 16(b):
A New Trend in Regulating Insider Trading, 54 CoRNEtL L. Rev. 45 (1969).
1- 737 F.2d 962 (1 1th Cir. 1984).
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purchase for cash to a rival tender offeror who had won the
takeover battle. 10
Defendant, Reiner, president and a director of plaintiff,
Super Stores, Inc., purchased 47,709 shares of plaintiff's common stock on December 16 and 17, 1982, for ten cents per
share."' Reiner later, on May 27, 1983, sold 130,148 shares of
common stock at a price of fifty-five cents per share to two
individuals, Lyons and Hirsch, who had made a public tender
offer for plaintiff's stock." 2 This sale included the 47,709 shares
of stock acquired earlier by Reiner."3 Reiner realized a profit of
forty-five cents per share, amounting to $21,469.05, on the sale
of the 47,709 shares." 4 Plaintiff sought to recover this profit as
having been received in violation of section 16(b). 5 Defendant
contended that he should not be found liable for a violation of
secton 16(b) since, having been thwarted in his bidding war for
plaintiff corporation's stock, his sale to Lyons and Hirsch was
"involuntary" and "was not the type of transaction to which
Congress directed § 16(b) inasmuch as there was no possibility
of abuse of inside information.""16 Reiner based this defense
upon the United States Supreme Court's decision in Kern County
Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp."7 There, the Court
applied the "pragmatic" test, based upon Congressional purpose, in exonerating Occidental Petroleum Corporation from

-,

The Fifth Circuit had occasion to consider this issue in a somewhat similar

situation in Texas Int'l Airlines v. National Airlines, Inc., 714 F.2d 533 (5th Cir. 1983),
cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1052 (1984) (cash-for-stock transaction comes within the statutory
language).
737 F.2d at 963.
Id. at 963, 964.
Id. at 964.
"" Id. A bidding war for the plaintiff's stock resulted after the approval on October
28, 1982 of a proposed merger agreement between the plaintiff and SDS of Bog, Inc.
Reiner was the president and sole shareholder of SDS of Bog, Inc. Under the merger
agreement, which was submitted to the plaintiff's shareholders for approval, the plaintiff's dissenting shareholders were given an option to receive 10¢ per share for their stock.
The price offered to dissenting shareholders was raised several times as a result of
changes in the offer price by Lyons and Hirsch. Id.
Id. at 963.
Id. at 964.
411 U.S. 582 (1973).
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liability for short-swing profits growing out of a merger trans-

action. 18
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Reiner rejected
this defense and adopted as its opinion the recommendations of
a magistrate to whom the case had been referred by the district
court." 9 In recommending that judgment be entered in favor of
the plaintiff, the magistrate pointed to the emphasis that the
Supreme Court gave in Kern to looking at Congressional purpose
in cases "where characterization of transactions as 'sales' was
not obvious" as compared with "orthodox cash for stock trans20
actions," which were clearly within the purview of the statute.
Based on this distinction between the "orthodox" or "unorthodox" nature of the transaction giving rise to the short-swing
profits, the magistrate concluded: "In this action a corporate

"I In Kern, Occidental Petroleum Corp., seeking to acquire Kern County Land
Co. (Old Kern), obtained more than 10% of the outstanding shares of Old Kern through
a tender offer to the shareholders of Old Kern. The management of Old Kern arranged
a friendly merger with Tenneco, Inc., whereby a new corporation, Kern County Land
Co. (New Kern) would be formed and the shareholders of Old Kern would receive shares
of Tenneco stock for each share of their Old Kern stock. The Old Kern-Tenneco merger
transaction was closed within six months thereby creating an irrevocable right for Old
Kern shareholders to receive Tenneco stock in exchange for their Old Kern stock. In the
meantime, Occidental Petroleum Corp., finding its takeover attempt blocked, gave
Tenneco an option to purchase the Tenneco stock it was to receive in exchange for its
Old Kern stock when the Old Kern-Tenneco merger was closed, the option not to be
exercisable until a date six months and a day after Occidental's tender offer expired.
The Supreme Court held that neither the option nor the exchange constituted a "sale"
of Old Kern shares within the meaning of § 16(b). 411 U.S. at 596, 601.
,,9 737 F.2d at 963.
110Id. at 964. In Kern, the Court, after conceding that "traditional cash-for-stock
transactions that result in a purchase and sale or a sale and purchase within the sixmonth statutory period are clearly within the purview of § 16(b)," went on to observe:
In deciding whether borderline transactions are within the reach of the
statute, the courts have come to inquire whether the transaction may serve
as a vehicle for the evil which Congress sought to prevent-the realization
of short-swing profits based upon access to inside information-thereby
endeavoring to implement congressional objectives without extending the
reach of the statute beyond its intended limits.
411 U.S. at 593-95 (footnote omitted).
The source for the Kern Court's distinction seems to be a statement made by Justice
Stewart in Reliance Elec. Co. v. Emerson Elec. Co., 404 U.S. 418 (1972), where, in
denying recovery of short-swing profits in a cash-for-stock transaction, he remarked that
"where alternative constructions of the terms of § 16(b) are possible, those terms are to
be given the construction that best serves the congressional purpose of curbing shortswing speculation by corporate insiders." Id. at 424 (footnote omitted).
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officer and director facing defeat in a tender offer battle voluntarily tendered his stock to his opponents for cash. Nothing
in Kern creates an exception for such a transaction from the
21
short-swing profit prohibitions of § 16(b)."'
Cases such as Reiner serve as a warning to defeated tender
offerors in takeover battles that they cannot assume that they
will be given the benefit of protection from short-swing liability
under section 16(b) if they sell their stock in the target company
for cash within the prescribed six month period. This applies
even though defeated tender offerors may be able to demonstrate
that their sale was not based upon inside information. 2 2 As the
Supreme Court said in Kern: "The statute requires the inside,
short-swing trader to disgorge all profits realized on all 'purchases' and 'sales' within the specified time period, without
proof of actual abuse of insider information, and without proof
' 23
of intent to profit on the basis of such information. '
II.

A.

STATE CORPORATION LAW

Business Judgment Rule
Turning to developments in corporation law at the state level,

perhaps one of the most significant judicial decisions handed
down during the survey period was that by the Delaware Supreme Court in Smith v. Van Gorkom, 24 involving application

of the business judgment rule.

25

737 F.2d at 965 (citation omitted).
For a general discussion of the role of § 16(b) in the context of failed takeover
bids, see Comment, Short-Swing Profits in Failed Takeover Bids-The Role of Section
16(b), 59 WAsH. L. REv. 895 (1984).
'"' 411 U.S. at 595. This objective method of proof was recognized early in Smolowe
v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 751 (1943), where the
court said:
A subjective standard of proof, requiring a showing of an actual
unfair use of inside information, would render senseless the provisions of
the legislation limiting the liability period to six months, making an intention to profit during that period immaterial, and exempting transactions
wherein there is a bona fide acquisition of stock in connection with a
previously contracted debt.
136 F.2d at 236.
M
2

124

488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).

"I As stated by the Supreme Court of Delaware in Van Gorkom: "The business
judgment rule exists to protect and promote the full and free exercise of the managerial
power granted to Delaware directors." Id. at 872 (citation omitted).
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Courts have repeatedly stated that they will not interfere

with the exercise of business judgment by a board of directors
so long as that judgment is honestly exercised. 2 6 By the same

token, courts have also stressed the need for directors to exercise
due care and diligence in performing their managerial duties.' 27
Even though courts have not always found it easy to draw the
line between errors of judgment and negligent conduct,' 28 they

do recognize that exercise of care enters into the formulation of
judgment.' 29 As one judge put it: "When courts say that they
"ISee, e.g., Hathaway v. Huntley, 188 N.E. 616 (Mass. 1933), in which the court
remarked: "Directors of a business corporation in the absence of positive statutory
enactment are not responsible for errors of judgment or want of prudence in conducting
the business of a corporation provided they act honestly." Id. at 618 (citations omitted).
See generally 3A W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS §
1039 (rev. perm. ed. 1975).
I" See, e.g., Kavanaugh v. Gould, 119 N.E. 237 (N.Y. 1918), where, referring to
directors of financial institutions, the court remarked:
They should know of and give direction to the general affairs of the
institution and its business policy, and have a general knowledge of the
manner in which the business is conducted, the character of the investments, and the employment of the resources. No custom or practice can
make a directorship a mere position of honor void of responsibility, or
cause a name to become a substitute for care and attention.
Id. at 238.
- See, e.g., Litwin v. Allen, 25 N.Y.S.2d 667 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1940), where the
court, in holding directors of a bank liable for losses sustained by the bank resulting
from the purchase by the bank of railroad debentures at par with an option given to
the seller to repurchase the debentures for the same price within a period of six months,
remarked:
In the last analysis, whether or not a director has discharged his duty,
whether or not he has been negligent, depends upon the facts and circumstances of a particular case, the kind of corporation involved, its size and
financial resources, the magnitude of the transaction, and the immediacy
of the problem presented.
Id. at 678.
'1 See, e.g., Selheimer v. Manganese Corp. of America, 224 A.2d 634 (Pa. 1966),
where the court, in finding directors liable for using funds obtained from a sale of stock
to promote an unprofitable manganese plant in Paterson, New Jersey, instead of a new
plant in Colvn, Pennsylvania, remarked:
Defendants' actions in respect to the Coliyn plant were not the result
of errors in judgment or a calculated business risk nor can such actions be
classified as mere negligence. With the knowledge which defendants had
of the unsuitability of the Paterson plant for profitable production, the
pouring of Manganese's funds into this plant defies explanation; in fact,
the defendants have failed to give any satisfactory explanation or advance
any justification for such expenditures.
Id. at 646.
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will not interfere in matters of business judgment, it is presupposed that judgment-reasonable diligence-has in fact been
exercised."' 3 0 It was this need for an informed business judgment
that the Delaware Supreme Court stressed in Van Gorkom. 3 '
In this case, Jerome W. Van Gorkom, Chief Executive Officer and Chairman of the Board of Directors of Trans Union
Corporation, a publicly-traded diversified holding company, approached Jay A. Pritzker, a well-known corporate takeover specialist, about his possible interest in a leveraged buy-out of Trans
Union at a price of fifty-five dollars per share. 3 2 After further
discussions between Van Gorkom and Pritzker, Pritzker made a
cash-out merger offer for Trans Union at Van Gorkom's proposed price, which was substantially higher than the then current
thirty-eight dollars per share market price.' 33 At a special meeting
of the Trans Union board of directors on September 20, 1980,
the directors approved the proposed merger. 34 Subsequently, at
a meeting of the shareholders of Trans Union held on February
10, 1981, a total of 69.9 percent of the outstanding shares voted
in favor of the merger proposal. 35 Shareholders representing
other shares of Trans Union brought a class action in the Delaware Court of Chancery to rescind the merger or, in the alternative, to obtain damages from members of the Trans Union
36
board of directors and the Pritzker interests.'
37
The court of chancery held for the defendant directors,
finding that the directors had acted in an informed manner and
that the shareholders had been "fully informed" when voting
on the proposed merger.' 3 8 The Delaware Supreme Court, in a
Casey v. Woodruff, 49 N.Y.S.2d 625, 643 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1944).
488 A.2d at 872.
Id. at 864-66. Van Gorkom's seeking a sale of Trans Union had originated from
senior management's concern about the company's inability to generate sufficient taxable
income to offset increasingly large investment tax credits. Id. at 864.
"I Id. at 867.
1-4

Id. at 869.

"I Id. at 870.
,26Id. at 863-64. The Pritzker interests included New T. Co., a wholly owned
subsidiary of Marmon Group, Inc., into which Trans Union was to be merged, and Jay
A. Pritzker and Robert A. Pritzker, who owned Marmon Group, Inc. Id. The Pritzkers
were later dismissed, with prejudice, as defendants by stipulation of the parties. Id. at
864 n.2.
W Id. at 864.
,33Id.
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3-2 decision, concluded that both of these rulings by the court
of chancery were "clearly erroneous.' ' 39 The supreme court held

that the trial court "committed reversible error in applying the
business judgment rule in favor of the director defendants."'"
The supreme court remanded the case to the court of chancery
with orders that the court "conduct an evidentiary hearing to
determine the fair value of the shares represented by the plaintiff

class, based on the intrinsic value of Trans Union on September
20, 1980,"'' 4 and to award damages "to the extent that the fair
' 42
value of Trans Union exceeds $55 per share.'
In reversing the court of chancery's finding that the defend-

ant directors were entitled to the protection of the business
judgment rule because they had acted in an informed manner,
the supreme court stressed that "[t]he determination of whether

a business judgment is an informed one turns on whether the
directors have informed themselves 'prior to making a business
decision, of all material information reasonably available to
them.'

""43

Pointing out that "[a]

director's duty to inform

himself in preparation for a decision derives from the fiduciary
capacity in which he serves the corporation and its stockhold-

ers,'" 144 and that "fulfillment of the fiduciary function requires
more than the mere absence of bad faith or fraud,' '1 45 the
supreme court said that "a director's duty to exercise an in-

formed business judgment is in the nature of a duty of care, as
131 Id. Justice Horsey wrote the majority opinion. Separate dissenting opinions were
filed by Justices McNeilly and Christie. Id. at 893, 898.
110Id. at 893. Summarizing the results of its lengthy opinion, the court said:
We hold: (1) that the Board's decision, reached September 20, 1980,
to approve the proposed cash-out merger was not the product of an
informed business judgment; (2) that the Board's subsequent efforts to
amend the Merger Agreement and take other curative action were ineffectual, both legally and factually; and (3) that the Board did not deal with
complete candor with the stockholders by failing to disclose all material
facts, which they knew or should have known, before securing the stockholders' approval of the merger.
Id. at 864.
141 Id. at 893.

1-2 Id.
14 Id.
at 872 (footnote omitted) (quoting Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812
(Del. 1984)).
" 488 A.2d at 872 (citations omitted).
1,5Id.
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distinguished from a duty of loyalty."

vious decision in Aronson v.

46

Lewis,' 47

Referring to their pre-

in which the court had

adopted a gross negligence standard for director liability under
the business judgment rule,' 48 the court in Van Gorkom once
again confirmed that "[w]e think the concept of gross negligence
is also the proper standard for determining whether a business

judgment reached by a board of directors was an informed
49
one.'
Under the guidelines thus established, the Van Gorkom court
concluded "that the Board of Directors did not reach an informed business judgment on September 20, 1980 in voting to
'sell' the Company for $55 per share pursuant to the Pritzker
cash-out merger proposal. ' ' 50 In support of this conclusion, the
court expressed its concern over the undue reliance by the board
of directors upon Van Gorkom's oral presentation of the Pritzker proposal at the September 20, 1980 meeting; failure of the
members of the board to properly inform themselves through
outside advice, or otherwise, as to the intrinsic value of the
company; and the action of the board "in approving the 'sale'
of the Company upon two hours' consideration, without prior

notice, and without the exigency of a crisis or emergency." '1 5,
The importance to the court of the directors' failure to properly
52
inform themselves about the intrinsic worth of the company

Id. at 872-73.
473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984).
" Id. at 812. In Aronson, which dealt with the application of the business judgment
rule to shareholder derivative suits, the Supreme Court of Delaware, referring to the
applicable standard of care expected of directors in Delaware, commented: "While the
Delaware cases use a variety of terms to describe the applicable standard of care, our
analysis satisfies us that under the business judgment rule director liability is predicated
upon concepts of gross negligence." Id. (footnote and citation omitted).
488 A.2d at 873 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 874.
'"
Id.
Id. at 878 (footnote omitted). In reply to an argument by the defendant directors
that "the magnitude of the premium or spread between the $55 Pritzker offering price
and Trans Union's current market price of $38 per share" indicated that the Board's
decision was an informed one, the court said: "A substantial premium may provide one
reason to recommend a merger, but in the absence of other sound valuation information,
the fact of a premium alone does not provide an adequate basis upon which to assess
the fairness of an offering price." Id. at 875. Further, the court said, "the adequacy of
a premium is indeterminate unless it is assessed in terms of other competent and sound

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 74

was also reflected in the court's rejection of the chancellor's
finding that the shareholder vote on February 10, 1981, should
serve to exonerate the directors from liability. 5 3 Referring to the
need for complete candor by corporate directors in seeldng approval of director action by the shareholders of the corporation,1 4 the court pointed out that the board in Van Gorkom had
failed to disclose to its shareholders that it "had not made any
study of the intrinsic or inherent worth of the Company."'' 5
The Van Gorkom decision serves to underscore what "may
become a significant limitation on the use of the business judgment rule to shield directors from liability, "156 namely, the need
for directors to exercise the proper standard of care in arriving

valuation information that reflects the value of the particular business." Id. at 876.
Criticizing the board of directors for failing to request a valuation study either from
inside management or from Salomon Brothers, Trans Union's investment banker, the
court did hasten to add:
We do not imply that an outside valuation study is essential to support
an informed business judgment; nor do we state that fairness opinions by
independent investment bankers are required as a matter of law. Often
insiders familiar with the business of a going concern are in a better position
than are outsiders to gather relevant information; and under appropriate
circumstances, such directors may be fully protected in relying in good
faith upon the valuation reports of their management.
Id. at 876 (citations omitted).
M Id. at 890.
154

Id.

Id. at 891. Justice McNeilly, in his dissenting opinion, chastising the majority
of the court for taking what he considered to be a narrow and limited view of the record
in the case, disagreed with the majority that the board had acted "in a grossly negligent
manner in informing themselves of the relevant and available facts before passing on
the merger." Id. at 897. Pointing to the background and expertise of both the "inside"
and "outside" Trans Union directors, Justice McNeilly said that he disagreed with the
majority's view that the Trans Union directors had been guilty of a "fast shuffle" by
Van Gorkom and Pritzker but rather believed that the directors "were more than well
qualified to make on the spot informed business judgments concerning the affairs of
Trans Union including a 100% sale of the corporation." Id. at 894, 895. Since he
believed that "[t]he Chancellor's opinion was the product of well reasoned conclusions,
based upon a sound deductive process, clearly supported by the evidence and entitled to
deference in this appeal," Justice McNeilly felt compelled to dissent from the decision
reached by the majority. Id. at 894. Justice Christie, in a brief separate dissenting
opinion, likewise said that he would have affirmed the court of chancery's judgment
since he believed "that the record taken as a whole supports a conclusion that the
actions of the defendants are protected by the business judgment rule." Id. at 898
(citations omitted).
156 17 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 221 (Feb. 1, 1985).
'I
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at their business decisions.'17 In view of the stern manner in
which the court applied the duty of care to corporate takeovers
in Van Gorkom, corporate takeover lawyers have been quoted

as saying, with some concern, "that boards of directors may
have to act with extra caution if they want continued protection
'5 8
for their decisions under the business judgment rule.'
B.

Takeover Defenses
In a second significant decision, Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Pe-

troleum Co.,1 s9 the Delaware Supreme Court considered "the

validity of a corporation's self-tender for its own shares which
excludes from participation a stockholder making a hostile tender
offer for the company's stock."'' 6
Mesa Petroleum Company, as owner of approximately thirteen percent of Unocal's stock, "commenced a two-tier 'frontloaded' cash tender offer for 64 million shares, or approximately
37%, of Unocal's outstanding stock at a price of $54 per
share.' 6' The "back-end" of the tender offer involved an exchange of securities purportedly worth fifty-four dollars for the

remaining publicly held shares of Unocal.

16 2 After

lengthy delib-

"I The standard of care expected of directors in the discharge of their managerial
duties varies somewhat from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. With the Delaware "gross
negligence" standard, compare the standard of care prescribed in the New York Business
Corporation Law, which is "that degree of care which an ordinarily prudent person in
a like position would use under similar circumstances." N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAw § 717
(McKinney Cum. Supp. 1984-85). For a general discussion of the duties of due care
imposed upon directors and officers, see H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CoRPoRATIONS § 234 (3d ed. 1983).
'"' Middleton, Lawyers See Warning in Court's View of Business Judgment Standard, THE NAT'L L.J., Feb. 18, 1985, at 8. For an interesting review of the implications
of the Van Gorkom decision, see Manning, Reflections and Practical Tips on Life in
the Boardroom After Van Gorkom, 41 Bus. LAW. 1 (1985).
'-' 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
Id. at 949.
Id. The legal and economic ramifications of the two-tier tender offer have been
widely discussed. See, e.g., Dennis, Two-Tiered Tender Offers and Greenmail: Is New
Legislation Needed?, 19 GA. L. REv. 281 (1985); Finklestein, Antitakeover Protection
Against Two-Tier and Partial Tender Offers: The Validity of Fair Price, Mandatory
Bid, and Flip-Over Provisions Under Delaware Law, I1 SEc. REG. L.J. 291 (1983-84).
11,493 A.2d at 949. Mesa Petroleum Co. explained in a supplemental proxy
statement sent to the shareholders of Unocal Corp. that the securities being offered in
the second step of the merger, referred to as "junk bonds" by Unocal, "would be
highly subordinated, and that Unocal's capitalization would differ significantly from its
present structure." Id. at 949-50.
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eration and, on the advice of its investment bankers, the Unocal
board of directors, which consisted of eight independent outside
directors and six inside directors, only one of whom did not
participate, unanimously approved a self-tender for its own
stock. 6 3 The terms of the board resolution provided that "if
Mesa acquired 64 million shares of Unocal stock through its
own offer (the Mesa Purchase Condition), Unocal would buy
the remaining 49% outstanding for an exchange of debt securities having an aggregate par value of $72 per share."' 1 4 Unocal's
offer expressly excluded Mesa from the proposal. In a suit
brought in the Delaware Court of Chancery, Mesa challenged
its exclusion from Unocal's exchange offer. The Vice Chancellor
granted Mesa a preliminary injunction. 165 While he agreed that
the Unocal directors had acted in good faith in opposing Mesa's
proposal as inadequate, 166 he nevertheless did not believe a selective exchange offer such as that made by the Unocal directors
was entitled to protection under the business judgment rule. 67
The Delaware Supreme Court accepted an interlocutory appeal
certified to them on this issue by the court of chancery.
Reversing the court of chancery's decision, the Delaware
Supreme Court held that the board of directors' action in countering Mesa's inadequate and coercive tender offer with its own
exchange offer was a reasonable response consistent with the
directors' duty to ensure that the minority shareholders of Unocal were treated fairly.168 Responding to Mesa's argument that
it is unlawful for a corporation to discriminate against one
shareholder in making a self-tender offer, 169 the court pointed
out that "the principle of selective stock repurchases by a Delaware corporation is neither unknown nor unauthorized ' 170 and
that "[t]he restriction placed upon a selective stock repurchase
is that the directors may not have acted solely or primarily out

Ild. at 951.
' ' Id.
'

Id. at 952.

'6

Id. at 952-53.

,67 Id. at 953.

- Id. at 956-57.
-6Id. at 957.
17

Id. (citations omitted).
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of a desire to perpetuate themselves in office."' 17' In addition to
the requirement that the directors must have acted "for the

welfare of the corporation and its stockholders" rather than for
their own self-interest, 172 the defensive measure must be "reasonable in relation to the threat posed." 17 3 Noting that the board,
in adopting the selective exchange offer, had stated that its
objective was either to defeat the inadequate Mesa offer or
protect the forty-nine percent of its shareholders who would
otherwise be forced to accept "junk bonds," the court said that

it was "satisfied that the selective exchange offer is reasonably
74
related to the threats posed.'

1

The court concluded that "there was directorial power to
oppose the Mesa tender offer, and to undertake a selective stock

"I Id. at 955 (citations omitted). Perhaps the leading Delaware case recognizing a
board of directors' right to authorize repurchase of a corporation's own shares from a
corporate raider is Cheff v. Mathis, 199 A.2d 548 (Del. 1964), in which the Supreme
Court of Delaware adopted the following test:
[I]f
the actions of the board were motivated by a sincere belief that the
buying out of the dissident stockholder was necessary to maintain what
the board believed to be proper business practices, the board will not be
held liable for such decision, even though hindsight indicates the decision
was not the wisest course. ... On the other hand, if the board has acted
solely or primarily because of the desire to perpetuate themselves in office,
the use of corporate funds for such purposes is improper.
199 A.2d at 554 (citations omitted).
The court based this distinction upon a similar standard used in evaluating management's use of corporate funds to support its position in a proxy contest. See Hall v.
Trans-Lux Daylight Picture Screen Corp., 171 A. 226 (Del. Ch. 1934). In Hall, the
Delaware Chancellor, after reviewing previous English and American authorities, said:
I gather the principle from these authorities to be that where reasonable expenditures are in the interest of an intelligent exercise of judgment
on the part of the stockholders upon policies to be pursued, the expenditures are proper; but where the expenditures are solely in the personal
interest of the directors to maintain themselves in office, expenditures made
in their campaign for proxies are not proper.
171 A. at 228.
493 A.2d at 955.
," Id. The court added that "[t]his entails an analysis by the directors of the nature
of the takeover bid and its effect on the corporate enterprise." Id. Examples of such
concerns, the court said, might include such matters as "inadequacy of the price offered,
nature and timing of the offer, questions of illegality, the impact on 'constituencies'
cher than shareholders (i.e., creditors, customers, employees, and perhaps even the
community generally), the risk of nonconsummation, and the quality of securities being
offered in the exchange." Id. (citation omitted).
,,4
Id. at 956.

KENTUCKY LAW JouRNAL

exchange,'

'1 75

[Vol. 74

and that "the selective stock repurchase plan cho-

sen by Unocal [was] reasonable in relation to the threat ...
posed.' ' 7 6 Thus, "[u]nder those circumstances the board's action
is entitled to be measured by the standards of the business

judgment rule.' '1 77 So, said the court:

[Uinless it is shown by a preponderance of the evidence that
the directors' decisions were primarily based on perpetuating
themselves in office, or some other breach of fiduciary duty
such as fraud, overreaching, lack of good faith, or being
uninformed, a Court will not substitute its judgment for that
78
of the board.

While there has been some concern about whether a board
of directors should take an active role in determining whether a
tender offer is in the best interest of the corporation and its

shareholders, or rather should assume a passive role, 79 the Delaware Supreme Court's decision in Unocal should provide further reassurance to Delaware corporations' management that
Delaware will continue to support management's use of appropriate defenses in responding to hostile takeover bids that management reasonably concludes are not in the best interests of the
shareholders. 8 0
Id. at 958. Earlier in its opinion the court had remarked that under § 141(a) of
the Delaware General Corporation Law "Itihe board has a large reservoir of authority
upon which to draw" in discharging its managerial responsibilities. Id. at 953. Section
141(a) provides, in part: "The business and affairs of every corporation organized under
this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors, except
as may be otherwise provided in this chapter or in its certificate of incorporation ......
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (1983). The Kentucky Business Corporation Act contains
a similar provision. See Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 271A.175 (Bobbs-Merrill 1981) [hereinafter cited as KRS].
176493 A.2d at 958. The court cautioned, however, that a board's power to protect
the corporation and its owners from perceived harm was not absolute and that "[a]
corporation does not have unbridled discretion to defeat any perceived threat by any
Draconian means available." Id. at 955.
I Id. at 958.
171

17

Id.

See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management
in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARv. L. Rav. 1161 (1980-81).
10 For a helpful discussion of the Delaware business judgment rule in the context
of a takeover attempt involving defensive acquisitions by the target company, see Panter
v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 293-97 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092
(1981).
"I
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C. Limited Liability

Turning to the more traditional areas of state corporation
law, a recent decision by the Iowa Supreme Court, Adam v. Mt.
PleasantBank & Trust Co.,"" illuminates courts' attitude about

the continued availability of limited liability when a gap in a
corporation's existence occurs through expiration of its period
18 2
of duration.
In Adam, plaintiffs, a group of Iowa farmers, delivered grain

to an elevator operated by Prairie Grain Company. Later, the
company was unable to return the grain due to shortages.' 83

Plaintiffs then brought a suit naming as defendants, among
others, the company's officers and directors, alleging that the

individual defendants, as owners, were operating the business as
a partnership and were therefore individually liable for the partnership's debts. Blake Phelps, an individual defendant, denied
that he was a partner in Prairie Grain Company but rather was
only involved with Prairie Company, a legally incorporated business. Plaintiffs countered that Prairie Company had no legal
status as a corporation because its corporate existence had expired before the grain transactions with the plaintiffs.

84

Prairie

355 N.W.2d 868 (Iowa 1984).
Of course, this problem has been greatly reduced through permission granted in
current corporation statutes to make corporate existence perpetual. See, e.g., KRS §
271A.270(l)(b) (1981). Indeed, in Delaware, and under some of the more recent statutory
revisions, corporate existence is made perpetual unless limited by provisions in the articles
of incorporation. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,§ 102(b)(5); REVISED MODEL BusINEss
CORP. ACT § 3.02 (1984) [hereinafter cited as REVISED MODEL ACT].
355 N.W.2d at 870.
Id. The plaintiffs also asserted that "the company was not a legal corporation
because of various violations of Iowa corporation law as to the operation of the
corporation, such as holding annual meetings." Id. There were also allegations that
Raymond Keller, another of the individual defendants, "dominated the business, that
the board of directors and shareholders never set policy, and that Raymond Keller used
Prairie Grain funds for his own purposes." Id. The trial court had taken the position
that challenges to corporate existence based upon allegations that formalities had not
been satisfied could be made only by means of a quo warranto proceeding. Id. The
Supreme Court of Iowa agreed with the Iowa Court of Appeals that the quo warranto
remedy was not the exclusive remedy, or even the appropriate remedy, when the challenge
to corporate existence was in the context of private litigation not involving the public
interest. Id. at 871. Treating the plaintiff's theory as one based upon "piercing the
corporate veil," the Iowa Court of Appeals said, as quoted by the Supreme Court of
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Grain Company's corporate existence had terminated on August
14, 1978, prior to the transactions involved, and the business
had not been reincorporated until February 7, 1980, after the
grain transactions.I s5 Although the effect of the gap in Prairie
Grain Company's corporate existence had not been briefed when
the case went to the Iowa Court of Appeals on an appeal from
a partial summary jugment entered by the trial court in favor
of Phelps, the court of appeals determined that "the reestablishment of the corporate charter did not retroactively restore the
privilege of limited liability during the gap in corporate existence." 86
On review of the court of appeals decision, the Iowa Supreme
Court held that "[t]he court of appeals was correct in determining that limited liability for Prairie Grain's officers, agents, and
shareholders does not exist for matters occurring during suspension of the corporate charter.' 1 87 Recognizing that "[i]n the
absence of a statutory expression, the authorities are not entirely
clear on the existence of limited liability during suspension after
a corporate charter has expired and before it has been reinstated, '"18 8 the court considered the better-reasoned view to be
that expressed by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in Moore
v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission.'89 The
court in Moore said that, in the absence of statutory direction
to the contrary, it preferred to follow those jurisdictions, a
majority, that "have construed their statutes of dissolution as
imposing personal responsibility on the directors for any liabilities, whether in contract or in tort, incurred in the continued
operations of the dissolved corporation's business after forefei-

Iowa:
Under this theory, plaintiffs do not challenge the fact that the elevator was
organized as a legal corporation; instead, they contend that the corporate
entity may be disregarded due to particular circumstances in this case.
Thus, the quo warranto remedy is neither the appropriate procedural device
nor relevant to plaintiffs' theory of piercing the corporate veil.
Id. at 871-72.
185Id. at 872.
Id. at 873.
187
Id. at 874.
M Id. at 873.
,89
591 F.2d 991 (4th Cir. 1979).
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ture of its charter."' 9 Noting that the Iowa Business Corporation Act was silent on the subject,' 91 the Iowa Supreme Court
in Adam reversed the trial court's judgment treating the revival
of the corporate existence of Prairie Company as protecting the
92
individual defendants, such as Phelps, from personal liability.'

Since the Kentucky Business Corporation Act is similar to
the Iowa statute in this regard,

93

Adam serves to underscore the

potentially traumatic effect that allowing corporate charters to
expire may have upon the limited liability status enjoyed by
corporate directors, officers, and shareholders.

194

', Id. at 994 (footnote omitted). In Moore, the corporation involved, Life Science
Products Co., had been dissolved automatically as a matter of law under the Virginia
corporate dissolution statutes "for failure to file the annual report and to pay certain
franchise taxes and penalty required by law." Id. at 992. The Virginia statutory provisions permit application for reinstatement of the corporate existence in such cases and
state that upon entry of reinstatement order, "the corporate existence shall be deemed
to have continued from the date of dissolution." See VA. CODE § 13.1-92 (Supp. 1984)
(subsequently repealed and replaced by § 13.1-754 (1985)). The Virginia reinstatement
statute, however, further provides that such reinstatement "shall have no effect on any
question of personal liability of the directors, officers or agents in respect of the period
between dissolution and reinstatement." Id. In the face of such specific language as this
the Moore court said that it was clear to them that "the Virginia reinstatement statute
does not relieve the directors, who have continued the corporate business, of individual
liability for actions in the interim period between dissolution and reinstatement." 591
F.2d at 996. As to the liability of directors and officers for continuation of a business
after dissolution by operation of law, see generally 16A W. FLETCHER, supra note 126,
§ 8132.1 (Supp. 1985).
'"' See IOvA CODE ANN. § 496A.102 (1962). The relevant portion of this section
reads: "If the period of duration of a corporation has expired, it may . . . amend its
articles of incorporation at any time within five years after the date of such expiration
so as to extend its period of duration." Id.
"1 355 N.W.2d at 874.
1 See KRS § 271A.515 (1981). This section, which deals generally with survival of
remedies after dissolution of a corporation and which provides for a period of two years
for bringing actions, provides, in part: "If such corporation was dissolved by the
expiration of its period of duration, such corporation may amend its articles of incorporation at any time during such period of two (2) years so as to extend its period of
duration." Id. It is interesting to note that under the provisions of the Revised Model
Business Corporation Act, where dissolution has occurred because the corporation's
period of duration has expired, reinstatement of its corporate existence can be achieved
within two years after the effective date of dissolution and under such circumstances the
reinstatement "relates back to and takes effect as of the effective date" of the dissolution. See REVISED MODEL ACT § 14.22 (1984).
I'mOne further possible protection for persons carrying on business in the corporation's name after the term of its existence has expired would be through use of the de
facto doctrine. However, there has existed "a conflict of authority as to whether, in the
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Appraisal Remedy

The Kentucky Court of Appeals, in Yeager v. Paul Semonin
Co.,195 considered whether the appraisal remedy provided dissenting shareholders in corporate mergers by the Kentucky Business Corporation Act is the exclusive remedy for such
shareholders. 196
This exclusivity issue has been particularly troublesome in
jurisdictions, such as Kentucky, that follow the older provisions
on dissenters' rights in the Model Business Corporation Act since
those provisions contain no specific exceptions to the appraisal
remedy.1 97 After requiring that a shareholder dissenting from a
merger or sale of assets make written demand on the corporation
for payment of the fair value of such shareholder's shares, the
Kentucky Business Corporation Act states: "Any shareholder
making such demand shall thereafter be entitled only to payment
as in this section provided and shall not be entitled to vote or
to exercise any other rights of a shareholder."' 93 This language
absence of any bona fide attempt to extend corporate existence, a corporation can be
considered to have a de facto existence by continuing to carry on the business in its
corporate name after the term of existence specified in its articles has expired." H.
BALIANTINE, CORPORATIONS § 34 (rev. ed. 1946). See also 13A W. FLETCHER, supra note
126, § 6658 (rev. perm. ed. 1984).
1"5691 S.W.2d 227 (Ky. Ct. App. 1985) (discretionary review denied by the Kentucky Supreme Court and the opinion ordered published). In another Kentucky case
decided during the survey period, the Kentucky Supreme Court held that a minority
shareholder could be treated as a third-party beneficiary of an agreement between the
majority shareholder and a purchaser of the corporate assets. See Simpson v. JOC Coal,
Inc., 677 S.W.2d 305 (Ky. 1984).
'96691 S.W.2d at 228.
'17 Statutes in some jurisdictions contain specific language making the right .to
dissent exclusive, but these statutes usually, as in New York, expressly except conduct
that is "unlawful or fraudulent." See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAWv § 623(k) (McKinney
Cum. Supp. 1984-85). This issue was clarified in the Model Act's revised appraisal
provisions, which became effective in 1978. An exclusivity provision was added to § 80
of the Model Act making the appraisal remedy exclusive except in cases of "unlawful
or fraudulent conduct." ABA-ALI MODEL BusiNss CORP. ACT § 80(d) (rev. ed. 1979).
For a discussion of the 1978 revisions, see Conard, Amendments of Model Business
CorporationAct Affecting Dissenters' Rights (Sections 73, 74, 80 and 81), 33 Bus. LAVe.
2587 (1977-78). These changes have been carried forward and made a part of the Revised
Model Business Corporation Act. See REVISED MODEL ACT § 13.02(b) (1984).
'- KRS § 271A.405(1) (1981). Further confirmation that appraisal is the only
remedy contemplated under the statute is found in the following language contained in
KRS § 271A.405(1): "Any shareholder failing to make demand ... shall be bound by
the terms of the proposed corporate action."
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contains strong implications that the appraisal remedy is intended to be exclusive under any and all circumstances.' 99
In Yeager, plaintiff Yeager sought to enjoin the merger of
Paul Semonin Associates, Inc. and Paul Semonin Co. (PSC), in
which he owned one hundred of 698,222 outstanding shares of
stock. Yeager also wished to recover the amount he originally
paid for the stock owned by him plus interest from the date of
purchase.200 Yeager had paid four dollars per share for the stock
but was to receive only $1.20 per share under the merger plan.
He contended that the merger was unlawful because its primary
purpose was to freeze-out the minority shareholders in PSC. The
trial court dismissed the complaint, treating Yeager's exclusive
remedy as appraisal and payment for his shares under the ap20 1
praisal provisions of the Kentucky Business Corporation Act.
On appeal from the order dismissing the complaint, the court
of appeals, agreeing that the legislature may have intended the
appraisal remedy to be exclusive as the general rule, commented
that "it does not appear to us as likely that it intended dissenting
stockholders to be so limited where a merger was being effected
in contravention of law, or where some species of fraud was
being worked upon the dissenters." 2 2 Otherwise, "[t]his would
be a signal departure from the customary public policy where
illegal or fraudulent acts are involved. ' 20 3 Therefore, the court
concluded that "[i]n the absence of a more specific expression
of legislative policy to the contrary, we do not construe a legislative purpose to deny judicial relief in a merger situation where
' '2 4
illegality or fraud are involved. 0
Despite the court's position as to the continued availability
of judicial relief where either fraud or illegality is involved, the

"' Comments to § 81 of the Model Act from which the Kentucky provision was
taken tend to confirm this interpretation of the appraisal provisions. These comments
state: "A few jurisdictions permit the shareholder to have his stock appraised or to sue
to set aside the transaction objected to, but ordinarily he may not do both. Some
jurisdictions expressly provide that the appraisal remedy shall be exclusive. The provisions
of the first paragraph of section 81 have the same result." 2 MODEL BusiNESS CORP.
ACT ANN. § 81, 2 (1971).
691 S.W.2d at 228.
N1 Id.
:2 Id.

ld. (citation omitted).
I,
-04Id.
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court nevertheless affirmed the trial court's judgment dismissing
Yeager's complaint because the court did not believe that the
record disclosed any issue as to fraud.20 5 The court said that

"[w]hile this kind of merger might strike one as somewhat
unfair," it did not constitute fraudulent or illegal conduct simply
because the merger allegedly was being consummated "only for
the purpose of 'freezing out' the minority" since the provisions

in the Kentucky Business Corporation Act dealing with corporate
mergers "do not limit the purposes for which corporations may
be merged." 206 Further, the court said, "we have not been referred to any case law from this jurisdiction which proscribes a
merger for the purpose of 'freezing out' minority shareholders. ' 20 7 Addressing the effort made in the Kentucky Business
Corporation Act to balance the interests of the majority and

minority in merger transactions, the court concluded:
In balancing the competing interests, the Legislature has attempted to come up with a scheme that is reasonable. No
doubt, the remedy of appraisal will not always work to the

satisfaction of the minority, or even the majority. Still, it
presents a generally fair and a reasonable alternative to frequent and protracted litigation, the cost of which minority
2
shareholders would often find prohibitive. 11
The Kentucky Court of Appeals' position in Yeager that

mere charges of unfairness by minority shareholders in cash-out
Id. at 229.
"0'Id. at 228.
210

2 Id.
203 Id. at 229. The court added:
"Consideration of the future prospects of the
merged corporation in appraising the value of a dissenter's shares, to the extent that
evidence of these prospects, beyond speculation, is available as of the statutory date for
valuation, would do much to enhance the fairness of the appraisal." Id. (citing Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983)). In Weinberger, the Supreme Court of
Delaware stressed that appraisal should ordinarily be considered the only remedy available under Delaware law to minority shareholders in a cash-out merger, except where
"fraud, misrepresentation, self-dealing, deliberate waste of corporate assets, or gross
and palpable overreaching are involved." Id. at 714 (citation omitted). The Delaware
Supreme Court ruled that, in the future, appraisal proceedings should be liberalized to
"include proof of value by any techniques or methods which are generally considered
acceptable in the financial community and otherwise admissible in court." Id. at 713.
The court said that "the standard 'Delaware block' or weighted average method of
valuation, formerly employed in appraisal and other stock valuation cases, shall no
longer exclusively control such proceedings." Id. at 712-13.
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mergers do not entitle such minority shareholders to seek injunctive or other equitable relief under Kentucky law in lieu of
appraisal rights would also seem to carry significant implications
for these shareholders under federal law. In Santa Fe Industries
v. Green,2 9 the United States Supreme Court stated that to
support an action under the antifraud provisions of section 10(b)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and SEC Rule lOb-5
there must be allegations of "manipulative or deceptive" conduct as distinguished from allegations of corporate mismanagement "in which the essence of the complaint is that shareholders
were treated unfairly by a fiduciary.1 210 Thus, minority shareholders in cash-out mergers may find that their exclusive remedy
under either federal or state law is the state appraisal remedy,
2z1
absent some allegation of misrepresentation or nondisclosure.

430 U.S. 462 (1977).
2,0Id. at 477.
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response to an argument by a group of minority shareholders in a subsidiary

corporation that the parent corporation's failure to give the minority shareholders
advance notice of a short-form merger was a material nondisclosure even though such
prior notice was not required by the applicable Delaware short-form merger statute, the
United States Supreme Court in Santa Fe Indus. replied:

But respondents [the minority shareholders] do not indicate how they might
have acted differently had they had prior notice of the merger. Indeed,
they accept the conclusion of both courts below that under Delaware law
they could not have enjoined the merger because an appraisal proceeding
is their sole remedy in the Delaware courts for any alleged unfairness in

the terms of the merger. Thus the failure to give advance notice was not
a material nondisclosure within the meaning of the statute or the Rule.

Id. at 474 n.14 (citation omitted).

